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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Wilkins argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions and the persistent violator finding, that the district court erred when it relied
on its own memory to find Mr. Wilkins to be a persistent violator, and that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on his felony conviction.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions and persistent violator finding, that the district court did not rely
on its own memory to support its persistent violator finding (or, in the alternative, that if
the district court did so, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), and that
the district court did not impose an excessive sentence.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments as to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the persistent violator finding and the district
court's reliance on its own memory in making that finding. While Mr. Wilkins continues
to assert that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the
district court imposed an excessive sentence, he will rely upon the arguments set forth
in his Appellant's Brief as to those issues.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wilkins's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1.

Was there sufficient evidence, in light of State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170 (Ct. App.
2010), to support the persistent violator finding?

2.

Did the district court rely on its own memory to support the persistent violator
finding?

3.

If the district court relied on its own memory, has the State met its burden to
establish that such reliance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Was Insufficient, Even Under State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170 (Ct. App.
2010), To Support The Persistent Violator Finding
The State, relying on the Idaho Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v.
Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170 (Ct. App. 2010), argues that it presented sufficient evidence to

support the persistent violator finding because the names and dates of birth on the two
judgments of conviction were identical to Mr. Wilkins', both judgments were from
prosecutions in the same county as the present offense, and "the prior crimes were
similar to the current crimes." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13.) For the reasons set forth
below, Lawyer is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
Lawyer concerned the sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding that the

defendant had previously been convicted of felony driving under the influence within the
preceding fifteen years, so as to trigger a DUI sentencing enhancement under thenIdaho Code§ 18-8005(7). Lawyer, 150 Idaho at 172. The Court of Appeals considered
whether the evidence presented by the State - that Lawyer's name and date of birth
matched those on the judgment of conviction and that the judgment of conviction was
for conduct that occurred in the same county - was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lawyer was the person previously convicted.

Id at 173.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held, "the evidence of the previous conviction
establishing the same name, same date of birth, same offense, and same county of
conviction is sufficient to establish identity beyond reasonable doubt."
(emphasis added).
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Id. at 174

The key factor distinguishing Lawyer is that only one of the two prior convictions
relied upon by the State was for the "same offense" as that for which he was convicted
at trial.

One of the prior convictions is for the same offense, "Possession of A

Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine)" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9), while the other is
for "Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver[.]"

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 10.) From the context of the Court's opinion, excerpted above, it appears
that "same offense" means the same crime. Possession of a controlled substance and
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver are not the same crime.
As such, Lawyer can and should be distinguished based on the Court's explicit holding.
II.

The District Court Relied On Its Own Memory To Support The Persistent Violator
Finding
The State argues that the district court did not rely on its own memory to support
its persistent violator finding. Specifically, the State claims that "an examination of the
entire context of the district court's comments" demonstrate that, while the district court
"acknowledged his familiarity with Wilkins[,]" it did not "rely on any of his own specific
personal knowledge of Wilkins' prior convictions to find that he was a persistent
violator." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) After quoting the entirety of the district court's
comments making its finding and explaining its reasoning, the State argues, "[i]t is clear
that the district court relied on the judgments offered by the state, and not on its
familiarity with Wilkins[,]" and that "Wilkins has failed to meet his burden to affirmatively
show that the district court's mere acknowledgement of its familiarity with Wilkins
contributed to its verdict finding that Wilkins was a persistent violator." (Respondent's
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Brief, pp.14-16.) For the reasons set forth below, this Court should reject the State's
argument.
A look at the district court's comments in context demonstrates that it relied on its
memory - at least in part - to establish that Mr. Wilkins was the person named in the
two judgments of conviction. In reaching its conclusion that Mr. Wilkins was the same
person named in the judgments, the district court explained,
Well, the Court has before it Exhibits 9 and 10. Those exhibits appear to
be authentic judgments for retained jurisdiction in Cases No. 07-10846
and 08-26542. They both pertain to Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins. The
same name that this particular defendant has been identified is [sic]. They
both pertain to the - and the Court did hear on the videotape and the
officer's testimony that this defendant gave that name to the officer in
particular. And that the date of birth listed in these judgments was
of
1973. The Court heard this particular individual on the videotape give that
date of birth for himself to Corporal Lind. And the Court, also I have to
say, has an independent memory of Mr. Wilkins as having been before the
Court before. Without looking at these judgments, I could not have said
what he has been convicted of, whether it was a felony or a misdemeanor,
without reviewing the documents. But I do recognize Mr. Wilkins. And
when I look at these particular judgments I do recognize Timothy Robert
Duane Wilkins of these judgments to be the Mr. Wilkins that is the
Defendant in this particular case.
(Tr., p.195, L.14-p.196, L.9.)
The State's attempt to classify the above remarks by the district court as those of
a "sensitive" court "wish[ing] to candidly acknowledge to the parties that he did, in fact,
personally recognize Wilkins" is unpersuasive.

In support of its argument, the State

claims,
It is clear that the district court relied on the judgments offered by the
state, and not on its familiarity with Wilkins, to find that Wilkins had been
convicted of two prior felonies as evidenced by the district court's specific
discussion of the judgments submitted by the state, and its findings that
those judgments reflected Wilkins' full name and date of birth.
(Respondent's Brief, p.15 (citation to record omitted) (emphasis added).)
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However, as the State acknowledges earlier in its briefing, merely establishing
that the name and date of birth in a judgment of conviction are the same as those of the
defendant is not sufficient to establish that the defendant is the same as the person in
the judgment of conviction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12 (citing State v. Lawyer, 150
Idaho 170 (Ct App. 2010).) In Lawyer, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that "evidence
of the previous conviction establishing the same name, same date of birth, same
offense, and same county of conviction is sufficient to establish identity beyond a
reasonable doubt." Lawyer, 150 Idaho at 174.
At trial on the persistent violator enhancement, defense counsel argued that
merely establishing that the name and date of birth on judgments of conviction were the
same as Mr. Wilkins' was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Wilkins was the same person previously convicted. (Tr., p.192, L.23 - p.193, L.16.)
In response, the State argued that the fact that Mr. Wilkins' name "is not a common
name" and the match between his name and date of birth and those contained in the
judgments of conviction was sufficient to establish his identity beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Tr., p.194, L.25-p.195, L.12.)
Immediately following these arguments, the district court assessed the identity
evidence, and explained that it recognized Mr. Wilkins as being the same as the person
named in the judgments of conviction, concluding, "I do recognize Timothy Robert
Duane Wilkins of these judgments to be the Mr. Wilkins that is the Defendant in this
particular case." (Tr., p.195, L.14 - p.196, L.9.) This additional context supports an
inference that the district court was grappling with the sufficiency of the evidence
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regarding identity, and attempting to reconcile the defense argument with the State's
argument.
The State did not argue that anything other than Mr. Wilkins' name and date of
birth were necessary to establish that he was the person named in the judgments of
conviction, let alone that the similarity of the crimes and the fact that they occurred in
the same county provided further evidence of identity. (Tr., p.194, L.25 - p.196, L.9.) It
would have been difficult for the State to have done so given the fact that Lawyer was
not issued until three months after the persistent violator trial. 1

Given the parties'

arguments and the comments of the district court, it is difficult not to conclude that the
district court relied on its memory in finding Mr. Wilkins to be a persistent violator.
111.
The State Has Failed To Establish That The District Court's Reliance On Its Own
Memory Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Under Chapman
In the alternative to its argument that the district court did not rely on its memory
in finding Mr. Wilkins to be a persistent violator, the State argues,
In this case, any error was harmless because of the overwhelming
evidence, as discussed above, that Wilkins had previously been -convicted
of two prior felonies. The state submitted two prior judgments from
Kootenai County that referenced two separate felony drug convictions,
and contained Wilkins' full and exact name, and Wilkins' full and exact
date of birth. (Tr., p.190, L.25 - p.191, L.12; State's exhibits 9, 10.)
Regardless of any erroneous consideration the district court gave to its
previous familiarity with Wilkins, it still would have found Wilkins was a
persistent violator absent that personal knowledge. Any error was thus
harmless.

1

Lawyer was issued on September 15, 201 O; trial on the persistent violator
enhancement was held on June 9, 2010. (Tr., p.182, L.1 -p.199, L.7.)
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(Respondent's Brief, p.17.) For the reasons set forth below, this Court should reject the
State's argument.
As the State acknowledges, because any error in the district court relying on its
memory was objected-to, it has the burden of demonstrating that any such error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it wishes to prevail in spite of the error.
(Respondent's Brief, p.17 (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010)).) In Perry, the
Idaho Supreme Court announced,
A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based
error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which
point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 222.

In doing so, the Court recognized that it was applying the Chapman 2

harmless error test, originally developed for addressing error involving constitutional
rights, to all objected-to error. Id. at 221-22.
The State cites no case law for its conclusion that the proper harmless error
analysis is whether the district court would have made the same finding even without its
reliance on its own memory. Nor could it have, given the requirements of the Chapman
test. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Supreme Court explained how
the Chapman test is to be applied and not to be applied. Id. at 279. The Court noted,
"Harmless-error review looks, we have said to the basis on which 'the jury actually

rested its verdict."'

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391

(1991)). The Court elaborated, explaining,
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to

2

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that
was never in fact rendered - no matter how inescapable the findings to
support that verdict might be - would violate the jury-trial guarantee.

Id. at 279-80 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, the State has sought to do just what the Court in Sullivan explained is not
to be done in a Chapman harmless error analysis: argue what the verdict would have
been had the error not occurred.

The State has failed to meet its burden to

demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the persistent violator finding "was surely
unattributable to the error." As such, assuming this Court finds that the district court
improperly relied on its own memory, thereby acting as a witness in violation of Idaho
Rule of Evidence 605, it should reject the State's harmless error argument.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Wilkins
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this
matter to the district court for entry of judgments of acquittal on both charges. In the
alternative, Mr. Wilkins requests that this Court vacate the district court's order finding
that he was a persistent violator, and remand this matter for resentencing without a
persistent violator enhancement, or alternatively, that it vacate and remand for a new
trial on the persistent violator finding before a judge who is not a witness. Finally, if
Mr. Wilkins is unsuccessful in these other claims, he respectfully requests that this
Court order that he be placed on probation.
DATED this 31 st day of January, 20

,NCER J. HAH
\ Depu)x State Appellate Public Defender
'· ·.

·-·~..•.-,,,,·J
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31 st day of January, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
TIMOTHY ROBERT DUANE WILKINS
INMATE #87098
JEFFERSON COUNTY JAIL
200 COURTHOUSE WAY
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LANSING L HAYNES
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816-9000
LYNN NELSON
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
PO BOX 9000
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816-9000
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
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Administrative Assistant
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